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Robert	 James	Walton	 v.	United	 States, 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit, 551 F.3d 1367; 2009 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 113.
While doing time in the federal pen, our 
litigious inmate was set to the task of develop-
ing and producing desk-blotter calendars for a 
government-owned corporation.  Said corp, 
Federal Prison Industries, Inc., produces a 
variety of stuff for our bloated federal bureau-
cracy.  And what a cost-saving measure it is. 
For this marvelous rehabilitative task, prison-
ers are paid in a range from $0.23 to $1.15 per 
hour.  Our inmate’s compensation is not part 
of the record.  He did however decide to in-
crease his income by a pro se suit for copyright 
infringement.
Which is to say he was his own lawyer.
Our inmate developed and produced quite 
a number of these calendars which the General 
Services Administration distributed to grace 
the Pinto Bean Desk in the Ag Department and 
other vital federal desks lined up in rows.  He 
later acquired an attorney to guide him in this 
ever-so landmark case.
To sue the US for copyright violation, you 
go into the Court of Federal Claims.  But right 
behind the jurisdictional grant in 28 U.S.C. § 
1498(b) comes language that says you don’t 
have a cause of action if your artistic creation 
was done (1) while you were in the service or 
employment of the US and (2)(a) where this 
was part of your job or (2)(b) you used Govern-
ment time, materials or facilities.
This naturally got the complaint dismissed. 
But if you’re doing time, you’ve got plenty of 
time for an appeal.
Court of Appeals for the  
Federal Circuit
First reread the “and” and “or” construc-
tion. Our inmate without question used federal 
computers thereby satisfying (2)(b).  And he 
was assigned this task thus checking (2)(a). 
But was he in the “service or employment” 
of the US?
Inmate argued that § 1498(b) used the terms 
“employment” and “service” interchangeably. 
Thus they mean the same thing.  And it is 
settled that prisoners are not employees.  See, 
e.g., Coupar	v.	U.S.	Dep’t	of	Labor, 105 F.3d 
1263, 1265 (9th Cir. 1997); Nicastro	v.	Reno, 
318 U.S. App. D.C. 72, (1996).
The US said where the heck did he get the 
idea the words were used interchangeably? 
Different parallel words used in the alternative 
just cries out different meanings.  Cf.	Bowers	
v.	N.Y.	&	Albany	Lighterage	Co., 273 U.S. 
346, 349-50 (1927).
In Bowers the Supreme 
Court considered a bar 
on any “suit or proceed-
ing” to collect taxes af-
ter five years of the tax 
return date.  Proceeding 
is not synonymous with 
lawsuit.  It can also 
mean distraint.
Which means seizing 
your property to wring 
out the money owed.
And to get a little more up to date, we 
have the cite of FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 
U.S. 726, 739-40 (1978) holding “obscene, 
indecent, or profane” are three different words 
with three different meanings.  Because it’s 
“a cardinal principle of statutory construction 
that we must ‘give effect, if possible, to every 
clause and word of a statute.’”  Williams	 v.	
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000).
Yes, Congress is not 
just trying to be verbose. 
Even if it seems that 
way.
Working in 
the pen under 
the direction 
of the guards 
constitutes 
being in the 
service of 
the US.
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Copyright — When You’re a Creative Soul,  
Everyone Wants a Piece of You
Crown	Awards,	Inc.	v.	Discount	Trophy	&	
Co.,	Inc.,	United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 8540.
Crown Awards designed the ultimate 
must-have item — a plastic diamond-shaped 
spinning trophy!  Aww-right!  Can’t you see 
that in your knotty pine-paneled den?
If only Dustin	Hoffman in the Graduate 
had come up with this idea, all of his emotional 
problems would have been solved.  But keep 
plastic in mind. It’s a key point in the case.
Naturally, others were envious of the wild 
consumer demand for this superlative work 
of art and wanted to sell it themselves.  Enter 
Discount Trophy which put their own plastic 
spinning diamond trophy on the market and of 
course were sued for copyright infringement.
After a two-day bench trial, Crown 
Awards was handed $22,845.18 in damages. 
And their lawyers made out like bandits with 
$165,528.01 in attorney’s fees.
There’s a big moral there, but I’m not sure 
what it is.
The Appeal
To win, you have to demonstrate a valid 
copyright — which Crown had — and in-
fringement.  The second bit requires proof of 
actual copying and a substantial similarity with 
the protected elements.  See Yurman	Design,	
Inc.	v.	PAJ,	Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 110.
As proof of access for the purpose of copy-
ing is hard to show, it suffices for the plaintiff 
to show the alleged infringer had a “reasonable 
possibility” of access to the original work. 
Jorgensen	v.	Epic/Sony	Records, 351 F.3d 46, 
51 (2d Cir. 2003).  “A court may infer that the 
alleged infringer had a reasonable possibility 
of access if the author sent the copyrighted 
work to a third party intermediary who has a 
close relationship with the infringer.”  Id. At 
53 (quoting Towler	v.	Sayles, 76 F.3d 579, 583 
(4th Cir. 1996).
And what was our access to Crown’s 
design?  Discount received Crown’s 2006 
Catalog and regularly monitored Crown’s 
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products. But — Discount bought the tro-
phy from Xiamen Xihua Arts and Crafts 
(“Xiamen”) and there was no evidence that 
Discount asked Xiamen to manufacture the 
Crown design.
It’s not clear, but it would seem that Xiamen 
is in China and therefore not a defendant. 
Discount put forward the defense that Xia-
men independently created the design.  The 
District Court found the credibility of Mr. Lin, 
Xiamen’s owner was — I love this — “non-
existent.”  And to quote the learned judge:
“I find it completely incredible that 
Mr. Lin who operates a company that 
makes resin products and who has no 
production capability to make plastic 
products would suddenly get it into his 
head to create a plastic trophy, let alone 
a trophy that would look like this par-
ticular trophy.  I find it utterly incredible 
that Mr. Lin would subcontract out the 
making of extensive molds purely as a 
speculative venture for a totally novel 
product for his business without having 
any customers for the product.”
And it gets better.  Discount is Xiamen’s 
only US customer.  It was “absolutely impos-
sible” to believe Xiamen did this without 
coordinating with Discount.  
Questions & Answers — Copyright Column
Column Editor:  Laura N. Gasaway  (Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill  







ANSWER:  Congress has never done 
anything to harmonize the two acts, Copyright 
and the ADA.  However, section 121 of the 
Copyright	Act permits “authorized entities” 
to make copies of nondramatic literary works 
in specialized formats for the blind or others 
with disabilities.  The definition of “authorized 
entity” is somewhat problematic in this situa-
tion.  The statute defines authorized entity as 
“a nonprofit organization or a governmental 
agency that has a primary mission to provide 
specialized services relating to training, educa-
tion, or adaptive reading or information access 
needs of blind or other persons with disabili-
ties.”  University libraries would not qualify 
under this definition.
Many academic and public libraries, pro-
duce large print or digital copies of works 
for the use of individual patrons who have 
disabilities.  One can argue that if such a ver-
sion does not exist, reproducing the work in a 
format that the patron can use fall under sec-
tion 108(e) of the Act which permits libraries 
to reproduce a substantial portion of a work or 
even an entire work after the library has tried 
to obtain a copy of the work at a fair price for 
the patron to use.  The copy must become the 
property of the user, the library must have no 
notice that the work will be used for other than 
fair use purposes and the work must contain 
the notice of copyright.  Although currently the 
Act is silent about making a digital copy of a 
work in lieu of a photocopy, but many libraries 
are doing so under the same conditions as they 
produce photocopies for users.








leave them to their own devices to figure out 
what	to	do	after	that?
ANSWER:  Under the first sale doctrine 
in section 109(a) of the Copyright	Act, after 
anyone (including a library) obtains a copy of 
a work in its collection, it may choose to lend 
these materials to others.  Instructing users not 
to deface the work, which is what cutting the 
patterns would do, would not be infringement. 
Fashion design is not protected under United 
States copyright law, but patterns are graphic 
works and typically are protected.  Thus, du-
plicating dress or crafts patterns via tracing or 
by another method likely is infringement.  So 
the library should not advise tracing as it would 
encourage infringement.
QUESTION:	 	A	 library	 in	 a	 botanical	
garden	 has	 a	 large	 archival	 collection	 of	
photographs,	many	of	which	are	 quite	 old.	
Unfortunately,	the	photographer	is	not	always	













ANSWER:  (1)  Ownership of the tangible 
item, the photograph or negative, is ownership 
of a copy, which may be the only copy of the 
work in existence.  This is absolutely separate 
from ownership of the copyright.  The only 
way an institution owns the copyright in a 
photograph is if the photographer or other 
copyright owner transferred the copyright to 
the library in writing.  Most likely, the library 
owns the copy but not the copyright.  (2)  If 
the photographs were published before 1923, 
however, they are in the public domain.  So 
publication is the important question.  If a 
photograph was never published, it entered the 
public domain at the end of 2002 or life of the 
photographer plus 70 years whichever is less. 
So, the library should make this determina-
tion and seek permission from photographers 
identified on the photographs.  Those with no 
provenance are more difficult.
Creating a digital archive of these photo-
graphs would be very useful both to the library 
and to the public.  (3)  While creating a digital 
copy of some of these photographs may be in-
fringement, in all likelihood, there is little risk. 
Many digital collections of photographs include 
a disclaimer to the effect that the copyright status 
of these works is presumed to be public domain 
due to the age of the work.  If someone has other 
knowledge, that individual is invited to contact 
the library with that information. 
QUESTION:	 	How	does	 one	prove	 that	




ANSWER:  Any written document can 
serve to prove that permission to copy was 
received.  A letter that is signed is great, but 
other writings can also establish proof.  If one 
obtains permission over the telephone, a con-
firming follow up memo to the copyright owner 
restating the permission he or she granted over 
the telephone is useful.
QUESTION:	 	Can	cataloging	data	pub-
lished	 online	 by	 a	 subscribing	 library	 be	
considered	 protected	 and	 not	 available	 to	
other	institutions?
ANSWER:  The easy answer is no; not 
everything is eligible for copyright protec-
tion.  Section 102(b) of the Copyright	Act 
states:  “In no case does copyright protection 
for an original work of authorship extend to 
any idea, procedure, process, system, method 
of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, 
regardless of the form in which it is described, 
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such 
work.”  This includes facts.  Individual bib-
liographic records are primarily factual in 
nature and therefore are not protectable.  A 
bibliographic database is a collection of facts, 
and one that is a total universe of data is not 
protectable.  On the other hand, a collection 
of bibliographic records such as in a subject 
bibliography, are protectable as a database 
created as a selection of material.  
